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Turkey through reading the abortion chronicles and exposes the utilization of women's
bodies and subjection of women to demographic state policies. To this end, we focus on
recent abortion debates originating from Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement on May 25,
2012 that suggested that “every abortion is a murder”. Our paper is a qualitative analysis
of the arguments of the members of the parliament following PM's statement on abortion.
We documented and contextualized the recurrent themes; (1) abortion as a rhetorical tool,
(2) trivialization of abortion, (3) medicalization of abortion, (4) abortion in the cases of rape,
(5) abortion as an economic imperative. As a result, we unravel the gendered discursive
limits of “pro-abortion” arguments in Turkey and reveal the frameworks within which the
political debates are shaped when women's bodies, sexualities and reproductive capacities
are at stake.
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Modern state power is consolidated through applica-
tion of political power on different aspects of human life
and body. Fertility control and discipline of bodies have
been at the very center of the modernization project in
modern Turkey as well as other countries. Since the
nineteenth century, regulation of women's reproductive
capacities has become part and parcel of the ongoing social
and political changes. The demographic policies accompa-
nying the modernization processes in the country pro-
duced a new discourse on reproduction. In this vein,
Demirci and Somel (2008) argue that Ottoman state
modernization in the nineteenth century led to the
effective regulation of women's productivity through the
introduction of legal, judicial, administrative, medical,
pharmaceutical, propagandistic, and educational policies
which aimed to prevent abortion and promote maternity.
A similar authoritarian and regulatory attitude towardsll rights reserved.reproduction can be detected in the early Republican state,
founded in 1923. Displaying a pronatalist approach, the
early Republican state introduced a new regulation in
1930 which prohibited both abortion and contraceptives
(Gürsoy, 1996: 532). In the post-1965 period, a new phase
began in terms of demographic policies, shaped by a
concern for rapid population growth and geared towards
inducing family planning. Accordingly, one could suggest
that regulation of women's reproductive capacities has
always been emblematic of social engineering projects in
modern Turkey. A recent example of this regulatory attitude
towards women's reproduction can be found in the AKP
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi — Justice and Development Party)
administration in Turkey, a party that has been in power since
2002 and displays an unambiguous pro-Islamic, conservative
orientation.
On May 25, 2012, in his speech at the Fifth International
Parliamentarians' Conference on the Implementation of the
ICPD (International Conference on Population and Develop-
ment) Programme of Action organized in Istanbul, Prime
Minister and AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for the first
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stated that he is against it:
“I see abortion as murder… There is no difference
between killing the child in mother's womb and killing
her after the birth.” (Radikal, 2012a).
Erdoğan restated his position at the AKP Women's Branch
Meeting on May 26, 2012 and further denoted that “each
abortion is Uludere1”, associating abortion with the mass
killing inUludere,where 34Kurdish villagerswere killed by the
Turkish Armed Forces, and implying that abortion is nothing
but murder. In addition to opposing abortion, Erdoğan
expressed that he is against cesarean sections, which he
interprets as a great hindrance to population growth in Turkey:
“I am a prime minister who opposes cesarean births, and I
know all this is being done on purpose. I know these are
steps taken to prevent this country's population from
growing further. I see abortion as murder, and I call upon
those circles and members of the media who oppose my
comments: You live and breathe Uludere. I say every
abortion is an Uludere…” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012a).
In Turkey, abortion has been legal since 1983 with some
restrictions regarding the timing and permission of the spouse.
Therefore, Erdoğan's attempt to reconsider women's right to
maintain or to terminate a pregnancy has created intense public
debates. Most of the MPs from the AKP supported Erdoğan's
views on abortion and made public declarations accordingly.
Announcing that a legal regulation may be introduced in the
near future, the Minister of Health, Recep Akdağ made the
following statement:
“…Given our political position, we put the emphasis on the
baby's right to live… People are asking about cases in which
the mother has been through something bad. If necessary,
the state will look after such babies. If we are to pass a law
that will call for tougher restrictions on abortion, we
deﬁnitely have to take some complementary measures.”
(Hürriyet Daily News, 2012b).
Some MPs from the AKP criticized Erdoğan's anti-abortion
discourse yet the effects of their oppositionwere quitemarginal
and could not attract a considerable amount of supporters from
among the AKP circles.2 On the other hand, MPs from the
opposition parties, namely the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—
Republican People's Party), theMHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—
Nationalist Action Party) and the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi
Partisi — Peace and Democracy Party), posed severe criticisms
against AKP's anti-abortion initiative. Considering the wide
spectrum of arguments countering the AKP's anti-abortion
stance, which aremostly raised by theMPs from the opposition
parties, in this paper we aim to investigate the streams of these
arguments and the themes that recur in these accounts. Since
this study dwells upon politicians' public statements, it may be
hard to generalize these views as representative of their
parties' political position on this matter. This is in part because
there is a lack of well-developed party positions on abortion
sharedwith public; rather the party leaders' comments are quite
fragmented andunclear. One can also suggest that the opposition
was caught off guard in trying to produce counter argumentsagainst Erdoğan's anti-abortiondiscourses. Although theAKPhas
been in power since 2002, none of the MPs from the party had
declared such an interest before. Therefore, having been caught
off guard, the opposition parties' responses to the AKP's anti-
abortion initiative aremore in the form of individual statements,
rather than representing a common unified party stance.
It is important to note that not all of these individual
statements display a pro-abortion stance that acknowl-
edges women's right to decide if, when and how to bear
children. Rather, some of them oppose the government's
anti-abortion argument in relation to other political issues
and do not develop their argument on the basis of women's
right to abortion. Another group strongly criticizes the
anti-abortion initiative yet their discourses are hampered
by a reluctance to refer to women's autonomy on their
bodies. Moreover, some of these individual statements
display hybridity in their approach to abortion. They
combine the advocacy of women's right to abortion with
a discourse that criticizes the AKP's anti-abortion initiative
without treating abortion primarily as an issue of women's
autonomy on their bodily integrity. This hybridity serves
to tone down the pro-feminist tones in their arguments.
To unravel the intricacies characterizing the opposition's
stance on abortion and grasp the complexity of their hybrid
discourses, it is important to disentangle these lines of
thinking, which can be outlined as follows:
(1) Some MPs from the opposition parties interpret
Erdoğan's anti-abortion initiative as a cover-up to conceal
the controversial facts about Uludere, an incident where
34 Kurdish villagers were killed by the Turkish Armed
Forces who hadmistaken them as terrorists. In this sense,
their opposition to the anti-abortion initiative relies on
an argument that has nothing to do with supporting
women's right to abortion.
(2) A group of MPs from the opposition parties criticize
Erdoğan's initiation of a public debate on abortion by
arguing that there aremore important and urgent topics
on the political agenda than abortion. This perspective
obviously trivializes the issue of abortion and attempts
to dismiss women's reproductive rights discussions
away from the political arena.
(3) Another recurrent theme in the opposition's “pro-
abortion” discourses is the medicalization of abortion.
To criticize Erdoğan's statements about abortion, some
MPs maintain that abortion is a technical issue which
should be reserved for experts — i.e. medical doctors.
This argument can be considered as another attempt to
depoliticize abortion and remove such “private” issues
as women's reproductive rights from politics.
(4) Some MPs oppose the anti-abortion discourse solely by
reminding the public of the prevalence of rape cases in
Turkey. As a result, they limit the debate on abortion to
rape cases and seem to defend the right to abortion only
for women who have been sexually violated.
(5) Finally, the framing of abortion merely as an economic
imperative for women with limited resources can be
detected as another limitation in the opposition's
“pro-abortion” discourses. This stance on abortion does
not allow for a discursive space where the idea of a
woman's autonomy over her body can be voiced.
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paper aims to reveal the discursive frameworks within which
the political debates are shaped when women's bodies,
sexualities and reproductive capacities are at stake. By closely
readingMPs' “pro-abortion” arguments articulated in response
to the AKP's anti-abortion initiative, this study enables us to
unravel the discursive limits in the political arena in Turkey,
which suppress the arguments in favor of women's full
autonomy in the realm of reproduction.
Women's bodies and reproductive citizenship in
modern Turkey
The agenda of citizenship studies has greatly broadened
recently and come to include new fields of social policy
such as identity politics, gender/sexual discriminations
and reproductive rights (Evans, 1993; Voet, 1998; Walby,
1994;Weeks, 1998). As a part of this new cohort of theories
on citizenship Plummer (2001: 238), puts forward the
concept “intimate citizenship”, a concept that helps to
investigate “public discourses and stories about how to live
the personal life in a late modern world where we are
confronted by an escalating series of choices and difficul-
ties around intimacies”. This understanding proposes the
idea of sexual rights as an extension of the liberal model of
social citizenship that is bounded by civil, political and
social rights. Another concept utilized to extend the scope
of citizenship studies is “reproductive citizenship”. Replac-
ing the concepts of sexual or intimate citizenship with the
idea of reproductive citizenship, Turner (2008: 52) states
that the modern state's attempt to control reproduction is
much more essential, when compared to its interest in
regulating sexual rights and setting out legitimate forms of
intimacy. States have historically been inclined to regulate
reproduction with the aim to sustain population growth
and reinforce the values and norms of a household constituted
by a married heterosexual couple. Contemporary examples
clearly reveal how states attempt to determine the conditions
of reproductive citizenship with the aim to ensure their own
survival. Accordingly, while the People's Republic of China's
one-child policy which is aimed at combating overpopulation
demonstrates strict regulation of reproduction, in contempo-
rary Russia, Japan and Singapore, states attempt to determine
the conditions of reproductive citizenship with the aim at
combating depopulation (Turner, 2008: 5). One can safely argue
that state power, citizenship and reproduction inmodernworld
are greatly intertwined. As a result, the social rights of modern
citizenship are, to a great extent, constituted by a familial
ideology of procreation. Turner (2008: 50) notes that households
and families as the social mechanisms for the reproduction of
society provide entitlements to men and women as reproducers
of the nation. Although Turner's reproductive citizenship, which
points out the interlockings between citizenship, state power
and reproduction, does not exclude men's bodies, it is obvious
that state's regulation of the reproductive capacities weighmore
heavily on women's bodies. In the Turkish context, a woman's
body, imagined as the “carrier of the seed of the nation”
(Delaney, 1991), becomes emblamatic of the terms of the
reproductive citizenship.
Turner's notion of reproductive citizenship acknowledges the
role of biopolitics in state's interest in population. In this sense, itechoes the Foucauldian account about state's attempts to control
the reproductive capacities of population. As Foucault (1978)
notes, modern administrative power via the ubiquitous means
of biopower utilized by diverse institutions such as family, school
or medicine, attempts to discipline the body and regulate the
population. In the complex network of social control, the body
comes under surveillance and is rendered docile by themeans of
medical, legal, educational discourses. Feminist scholars who
reconsider the Foucauldian framework through gendered lenses
suggest that the surveillance of women's and men's bodies are
not subject to the same degree of social control (Ramazanoğlu,
1993; Sawichi, 1991). They maintain that the Foucauldian
framework is gender-blind in that it fails to acknowledge how
omnipresent patriarchal codes rendering women's bodies docile
are when compared to the regulatory discourses operating on
male bodies.
In the late Ottoman social and political setting, modern
administrative power also produced regulatory discourses
on women's sexualities and bodies. Along with the ongoing
social and political changes at the time, a scientific language on
“healthy” marriages, which declared the proper age, hygiene
and health conditions necessary for a good marriage, and
technologies surveying health, morbidity, life expectancy and
fertility became widespread in the modernizing context of the
country and were backed up by an elaborate discourse on
women's sexuality (Duben & Behar, 1991: 138–139; Kandiyoti,
1998: 281). According to Parla (2002: 18), reformist men in
late Ottoman society were in an unconscious quest for fatherly
authority that had disintegrated through the encounters with
the West. For them, the most terrifying danger threatening
fatherly authority was not Western technology but morality,
i.e., the inner domain that bears the essential marks of cultural
identity. Women's sexually modest identities were deemed to
be the first and foremost constitutive feature of this moral
domain. In this regulatory discourse, while ideal women in the
male imagination were defined through sexual chastity and
purity, women who displayed sexually liberated mores and
manners were seen as the embodied state of a corrupted
morality.3 Therefore, one can make a claim that Puritanism
attached to female sexuality lies at the heart of the modern-
ization discourse in Turkey.
Demographic policies and regulation of abortion reflect
this proliferating discourse on women's sexuality in the
late Ottoman context. Demirci and Somel (2008) note that
the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century attempted to
effectively regulate women's productivity through legal,
judicial, administrative,medical, pharmaceutical and educational
policies. The criminalization of abortion in 1859 implied that the
irrevocable politicization of women's reproductive behavior was
an integral part of the ongoing transformations. Miller (2007:
361) argues that partial rights of entry into the public political
sphere could only be granted to women through regulation of
their bodies and sexualities. As a result, a woman's womb came
to be defined as a political place that does not belong to an
individual woman but to the biological collective.
Regulatory discourse on women's sexuality in the late
Ottoman era remained intact in the new Republic founded in
1923. In this new era, the ideal woman was defined as a
well-educated, professional, “modern but chaste” woman
who actively participates in the public sphere and fulfills her
responsibilities as a wife and mother in the familial sphere
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between male authority and emancipated women stipulated
thatwomenhad to protect their sexualmodesty in return for the
newly granted rights to enter into the public sphere (Kandiyoti,
1988). This elaborate discourse working on women's identities
and bodies brought with it strict regulation of women's bodies
and reproductive capacities. In 1926, the Turkish government
adopted a new Penal Code and introduced new regulations
concerning abortion.4 Another regulation concerning women's
reproductive capacities is made in 1930, prohibiting both
abortion and contraceptive devices. In the post-1965 era, a
new approach was adopted with respect to the regulation
of population, revisiting the demographic policies of the
early Republican period. In 1965, the introduction of a new
law concerning population planning rendered contracep-
tives legal. In the same regulation abortion was limited to
serious medical complications. It is only in 1983 that
abortion was legalized through the tenth week of preg-
nancy on the condition that the husband consents to it.
When the regulation of women's reproductive capaci-
ties in modern Turkey is examined historically, one can
argue that this historical trajectory is characterized by the
utilization of women's bodies for social and political
projects. As noted above, in the late Ottoman and early
Republican periods, women's sexuality had become sym-
bolic of the ongoing social and political changes of society
in general. Regulatory policies at the time attempted to
control women's bodies by outlawing abortion and en-
couraging fertility. On the other hand, the post-1965
regulations of women's reproductive capacities, which
were shaped by a new concern for rapid population growth
and which allowed abortion in case of serious health
complications, were not different from the regulatory
attempts of earlier periods when viewed from the aspect
of initial goal. Both forms of regulation were motivated by
an incentive to urge family planning for population control,
not by a concern for women's autonomy on their bodies.
Erdoğan's anti-abortion initiative becomes more clear
when considered in continuity with the historical trajec-
tory presented above. In this sense, both earlier periods
and Erdoğan's recent attempts to restrict abortion and
c-sections treat women's wombs as spaces to serve broader
political interests.
In this frame, Turner's notion of “reproductive citizen-
ship” accounts for the interlockings between reproduction,
state power and citizenship in modern Turkey. Modern
state's interest in regulation of population produces an
elaborate discourse concerning the limits of citizens' repro-
ductive rights as well as the duties they have to perform in
the realm of reproduction. It is widely stated that Turkish
citizenship is constructed on the basis of single religion,
single language, an organic vision of society and duty-based
citizenship, which does not recognize ethnic, religious and
language-based differences (Üstel, 2004). It is equally
important to note the gendered nature of Turkish citizen-
ship. One critical realm to make such a gendered analysis of
Turkish citizenship is reproduction. As Turner puts forward
in his account of reproductive citizenship, to reflect on the
broadening agenda of citizenship studies today, one has to
consider state's interest in regulating the population and
explain how such an interest in return contributes to thedefinition of ideal citizenship. One can claim that in modern
Turkey citizenship is not only defined through promoting an
organic vision of society and duty-based citizenship but also
over a certain demographic regime. Accordingly, the definition
of ideal citizenship in the late Ottoman and early Republican era
is made through encouraging reproduction. Ideal women
citizens were defined as those who bear the next genera-
tion offspring deeply committed to the ideals of the
political regime at the time. In the post-1965 period the
terms of citizenship had changed, presenting the ideal
woman citizen as knowledgeable about family planning
and birth control. Today, Erdoğan's anti-abortion initiative
signifies a return to pronatalist policies, which define the
ideal woman citizen as someone who “gives birth to at least
three children”5 and contributes to the state policies
by fulfilling her familial roles as mother and wife. The
trajectory above clearly demonstrates that the construc-
tion of reproductive citizenship in Turkey heavily relies on
the utilization of women's bodies for political purposes and
defines the ideal woman citizen in line with the demo-
graphic policies in force.
The AKP rule and gender in contemporary Turkey
The AKP rule in Turkey since 2002 has been marked by the
rise of conservatization in socio-cultural and political matters,
which has generated critical implications for gender relations
in Turkey. In the AKP's conservative politics, being a woman is
first and foremost defined within the familial sphere through
traditional gender codes. The great emphasis in party politics
put on women's familial roles asmothers and wives imply that
women have been rendered subservient to the unity of family.
In line with the central role attributed to the notion of family,
attempts have been made to take measures to prevent the
disintegration of the family.6 Accordingly, in conservative party
politics the disintegration of the family is perceived as themost
threatening aspect of themodern era Çitak & Tür (2008). Coşar
and Yeğenoğlu (2011: 561) define AKP's gender politics as a
peculiar form of neoliberal–conservative patriarchy, borrowing
from Islamic patriarchy as well as establishing an intricate
alliance between neoliberal and conservative frameworks,
which asks women to adapt to global market conditions, yet
at the same time to perform normative wife and motherhood
roles. Although the AKP initiated significant legal amendments
during its administration,7 considering the party's reluctance
to challenge the traditional gender roles in the familial sphere,
it is far from establishing a new gender regime that would
comprehensively improve women's status in public and private
spheres.
The definition of ideal womanhood in the AKP's conserva-
tive mind-set becomes more crystallized when the party's
hostility towards feminist political identity is considered. The
most overt expression of this hostility can be found in Erdoğan's
comment on the protest organized as a reaction to the draft bill
criminalizing adultery,whereby feministwomenmarched to the
Grand Assembly with the slogan, “our body and our sexuality is
ours”. Erdoğan denounced this protest by stating that these
“marginal” women, who do not comply with the traditional
values of society, cannot represent the ideal Turkish woman.
Here, it is quite clear that for the AKP's leadership, ideal
womanhood is constructed in parallel with traditional
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definition of a woman's identity over the familial sphere and
motherhood can also be noticed in AKP's call for having at
least three children. Akşit (2010) maintains that this call,
which operates through the utilization of women's bodies
for pronatalist political projects, signifies the beginning of a
new period for demographic policies in Turkey. It points out
the re-emergence of pronatalism, which imagines woman as
“the carrier of the seed” (Delaney, 1991). This understanding
of a woman's body as subservient to pronatalist political
aims regards the child as the seed of the nation. In this
regard, Delaney (1991) claims that with respect to the
cultural meanings of reproduction in Turkey, women's bodies
are perceived as “the soil” and men's sperm as “the seed”, i.e.,
the essential element in reproduction. The perception of the
woman's body as “the carrier of the seed” makes a woman's
body vulnerable to societal control and renders her womb
subject to regulation by the modern administrative power.
The recent anti-abortion initiative, first uttered by Erdoğan
and later adopted by other leading figures of the party, can be
better interpreted along these lines. The pronatalist motives
in this anti-abortion discourse, which represents abortion as a
great threat to the population growth in Turkey, stem from
the AKP's patriarchal, conservative politics defining women
primarily as mothers and women's womb as a place to be
regulated for broader political projects.
It is interesting to note that though many MPs from the
opposition parties opposed AKP's anti-abortion initiative, these
parties do not perform better when their approach to gender
issues is taken into account.8 Their stance in this regard is
characterized by a similar discourse that defines womanhood
primarily in the familial sphere.9 This is clearly reflected in
their “pro-abortion” discourses discussed below at length.
Discursive limits in pro abortion arguments
Following Erdoğan's statement that the government works
on a new law which would restrict the right to an abortion,
parliamentarians from the opposition parties, namely CHP, MHP
andBDP raised their voice to oppose this possible legislation. As a
result, AKP's conservative discourse on women's reproductive
rights received a considerable amount of criticism. This paper is
based on the content analysis of Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal,
Habertürk, Vatan and Hürriyet Daily News between May and
June 2012 where all the public statements of opposition parties
in the Turkish Grand National Assembly were documented.
These opposition politicians' statements on abortion were
covered, classified and contextualized. The responses of the
MPs range from defending women's autonomy on their bodies
to deeming the issue of abortion as irrelevant to politics. The
“pro-abortion” arguments articulated by prominent political
actors are quite discreet in displaying a pro-feminist attitude
towards abortion.
The feminist thinking about abortion places women's
autonomy at the center. The pro-choice feminist arguments
rooted in liberal political theory emphasize women's full
authority as right-bearing citizens to make any decision
regarding pregnancy and demand the state not to intervene
into women's reproductive freedom (Bordo, 1993). Some
others criticize this pro-choice thinking by arguing that women
do not make “private” choices free from social, economic, andpolitical constraints (Himmelweit, 1988). An alternative to this is
the protectionist line of thinking, which points out that the
framing of the right to choice as a negative liberty excludes
positive state intervention and thus fails to provide themeans to
realize this right to choose in practice (Petchesky, 1984). Another
attempt which reconsiders the pro-choice idea is the legal–
political theory making abortion rights claims on the basis of a
right to bodily integrity. According to this, the right to abortion is
understood as the right to realize the legitimacy of the individual
woman's projections of her own bodily integrity (Cornell, 1995).
In this understanding, right to abortion is presented as an
integral part of embodied citizenship and both the abortion
decision and the significance of that decision are justified on the
basis of a woman's ultimate authority on her sense of self
(Smyth, 2002). It is clear that in all these feminist lines of
thinking, the issue of women's autonomy is defined as a core
value.
A considerable segment of “pro-abortion” arguments articu-
lated by MPs on the political arena in Turkey fail to incorporate
into their accounts the idea of women's autonomy. The
discursive limits in their speeches indicate that when
arguing against the patriarchal discourses the opposition
does not always operate along pro-feminist lines. Below,
the wide spectrum of these “pro-abortion” discourses is
put forward and recurrent themes in these discourses are
identified.
Abortion as rhetorical tool
Upon Erdoğan' statement that “every abortion is anUludere”,
which associates abortion with murder and echoes pro-life
arguments in conservative discourses, many parliamentarians
reacted by accusing the PM for trying to divert the attention from
hot issues on the agenda.
Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP, stated the following:
“PM's remarks which aim to draw attention away from the
agenda have gone too far. Especially the remark “every
abortion is anUludere” can never be elucidated and is full of
dangers and weirdness.” (Habertürk, 2012).
Here, Bahçeli seems to be critical of the affinity that Erdoğan
identifies between abortion and Uludere and suggests that
these kinds of comparisons may lead to weird conclusions but
he does not explain exactly how and why the comparison
between abortion and Uludere is flawed. In this same speech,
he goes on saying that Erdoğan's aims concerning women's
reproductive capacities can never be genuine but may only
serve his other political interests (Habertürk, 2012). Moreover,
in order to strengthen his theory about Erdoğan's implicit aims
in bringing up the issue of abortion, Bahçeli asks why Erdoğan
haswaited for so long to take action even thoughhehas been in
power nearly for the last ten years. Bahçeli's criticisms clearly
do not stem from his intention to defend women's autonomy
on their reproductive capacities. In latter passages of his
speech, he stresses that his party is against abortion but sees
it necessary only when there is a medical complication
(Habertürk, 2012). Here, in putting the stress on the necessity
of abortion, rather than conceptualizing it as awoman's human
right, Bahçeli does not present abortion primarily as an issue of
women's autonomy.
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on the other side of the political spectrum, also used similar
arguments to criticize Erdoğan's statement and accused him
of blurring the agenda:
“He (PM) brought up another debate to cover up the
Uludere massacre; he said that ‘abortion is murder; I am
also against c-sections.’ This is exactly the illusionists' hocus
pocus trick… He opened up this debate to silence the
controversies surrounding Uludere.” (Cumhuriyet, 2012a).
As seen above, Kışanak, in a similarway to Bahçeli, interprets
Erdoğan's statement as a tacticalmove to cover up controversies
on the political agenda. Yet, in her speech she goes further than
simply evaluating Erdoğan's remarks as a cover-up. Kışanak also
frames the issue of abortion as a rights debate and questions the
PM's attempt to control women's bodies:
“…PM determines whether or not you are going to give
birth or how many children you will have. He further
comments on the birth method you have to choose… How
is it possible to use such sexist language? … All women,
without making any differentiation, should resist, saying
‘take your hands off our bodies’.” (Cumhuriyet, 2012a).
In her statements above, Kışanak criticizes the sexist
character of Erdoğan's speech and condemns it as an assault
onwomen's identities and bodies. Considering different shades
in her argumentation, one could say that her discourse is
characterized by hybridity. On the one hand, shemarks out the
debate on abortion just as a rhetorical tool utilized to shadow
other significant matters on the political agenda such as
Uludere; on the other hand she incorporates pro-feminist
ideas into her argument by strongly arguing for women's right
to control their bodies and reproductive capacities. This dual
character in her discourse can be attributed to intersections of
the debate on abortion with the Kurdish issue. At the last
instance, Erdoğan's remarks on abortion did not only affect
women's reproduction but also gave way to serious conse-
quences regarding the AKP's policies towards the Kurdish
issue. However, when the rhetoric in Kışanak's discourse is
carefully evaluated, one can detect that she begins her speech
by evaluating Erdoğan's statement as a strategic maneuver and
thus prioritizes this theme, which in return tones down the
pro-feminist elements in her argument.
Some parliamentarians refrained from evaluating the abor-
tion debate as a cover-up and refused to argue the basis of the
association established between abortion and Uludere, by
suggesting that one cannot compare and contrast a human
rightwith amass killing. Articulating this stance, Sebahat Tuncel,
an MP from the BDP, for example, stresses that “abortion is a
human right whereas Uludere was a massacre where the
perpetrators have not been exposed so far” (Cumhuriyet,
2012b). It is possible to suggest that her stance leaves more
room for discussing abortion with respect to women's rights
nevertheless her position is perceived as an individual MP
position not necessarily endorsed by her party.
Making abortion trivial
Similar to the interpretations of Erdoğan's statement as a
tactical move to camouflage hot topics on the agenda, someparliamentarians evaluated the debate on abortion as an
attempt to occupy the agenda to no end. They suggested that
there are more urgent topics to deal with than regulating
women's reproductive capacities. In this sense, Yakup Akkaya,
an MP from the CHP, expressed the following:
“While the country has to face so many problems, it is
symbolic that the PM has brought up such an issue as
abortion…” (http://www.chp.org.tr/?p=73740).
Similar way to this, Namık Havutça, an MP from the CHP,
denoted in a local newspaper that the AKP tries to conceal the
economic crises in the country by putting the issue of abortion
on the agenda:
“PM should leave the issue of abortion aside and has to deal
with the economic concerns of the producers. It is totally
wrong to busy the agenda with the issue of abortion while
the garlic producers in Pamukçu, rice producers in Gönen
cannot harvest their crop.” (Yenihaber, 2012).
An MP from the MHP, Lütfü Türkkan's reaction to Erdoğan
echoes the former statements in this regard:
“PM should deal with the problems of teachers, soldiers,
sergeants waiting to be appointed to post … not with the
sexual acts of some people.” (Radikal, 2012b).
Drawing on the statements above, one can note that while
opposing Erdoğan's views on abortion, some MPs represent
abortion as a trivial subjectmatter that should not overshadow
other significant matters on the political agenda. Accordingly,
the problem that theseMPs identify in Erdoğan's statements on
abortion is not the misogynist character of his speech but
rather the whole issue of bringing up the debate on abortion
itself; they deny the relevance of this debate for the public
sphere altogether at this time in history.
Medicalization of abortion
Another approach utilized by politicians with the aim to
criticize Erdoğan's views on abortion, is the medicalization of
abortion.10 MPs argued that abortion is a technical issue that
should be reserved for experts (medical doctors) and thus
the political authorities should not have the final say on this
matter which is way outside of their expertise. The CHP
leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's declaration below clearly exem-
plifies this stance:
“Their bodies belong to women. I cannot comment on that
issue. This does not concern politics. This is a medical
procedure. This has to remain between the doctor and the
patient… Who can decide on this matter? Of course it is
not up to us to decide. It is the doctor who is going to
decide. It is not appropriate to call public attention to an
issue that remains between the doctor and the patient all
around the world.” (Hürriyet, 2012).
Kılıçdaroğlu points out politicians' lack of authorization
with regard to abortion. Yet, while he delegitimizes Erdoğan's
statement about abortion by stressing that abortion is a
medical issue that has to be left to experts, he does not touch
upon women's right to abortion at all. In other words, the
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matter and provides him a safe room where he can refrain
from making a gendered critique of the debate on abortion.
Moreover, by deploying such a medicalization discourse, he
comes to define the boundaries of the political. In the very
same statement he indicates that since abortion is first and
foremost a medical issue, “it is not a subject that concerns
politics”. This perspective, which explicitly de-politicizes
women's reproduction, fails to see the complex ways in
which the modern state power operates through controlling
bodies, especially women's bodies, and thus turns out to be
a gender-blind stance.
An MP from the MHP, Özcan Yeniçeri resorts to a similar
medicalization discourse when he is asked to comment on
the AKP's intention to introduce a new legislation on
abortion:
“Abortion is a medical, scientiﬁc issue in Turkey. Its
terms have been codiﬁed by law… It has to be left tomedical
authorities, to scientists, to the medical society where these
kinds of applications are universally realized…” (Milliyet,
2012a).
Yeniçeri's statement resembles Kılıçdaroğlu's stance on
the issue of abortion in the sense that they fail to see the
inter-connection between politics and medicine.
In contrast to the MPs who avoid defending abortion
along pro-feminist lines through conceptualizing it as a
technical/medical issue that should be reserved for ex-
perts, some political figures resort to the same medicali-
zation discourse with the aim of preventing the government
party from carelessly talking about abortion. Accordingly, they
apply the medicalization discourse as a tactical strategy to
undermine the authority of the male speakers who associate
abortion with killing.
Having stated that abortion is a right acquired as a result
of women's movement, Kibriye Evren, a spokesperson for
the BDPs women's committee, underlines the fact that
abortion is a medical issue that is carried out depending on
the health of the baby and concludes that considering this,
the PM has no right to impose legislation regulating women's
bodies (Milliyet, 2012b). In a similar vein, Pervin Buldan uses
the same medicalization discourse with respect to the debate
on cesarean sections and maintains that “I have had two
c-sections; that is to say, it is the doctor who has to decide
whether it has to be a vaginal birth or a c-section. They (AKP)
have started to intervene into each and every sphere of life; yet
after all, both doctors and women should be able to use their
initiative on this matter (abortion)…” (Milliyet, 2012c).
From here, one can conclude that by presenting abortion as a
medical issue, thesewomen politicians point out the illegitimacy
of amale parliamentarian's attempt to deliver an opinion on this
matter and suggest he leave the abortion decision to doctors and
medical experts. Again, the hybridity of women MPs' pro-
abortion discourses needs to be acknowledged here. Although
they utilize the medicalization discourse, which is geared
towards depoliticizing corporeal issues and works against
women's right to control their bodies, they turn it into a stra-
tegy to counter the male speaker's hegemonic argument that
aims at nullifying women's choice to maintain or terminate
pregnancy.Defending the right to abortion over rape cases
With the aim of challenging AKP's conservative, patriarchal
pro-life discourses, MPs from the opposition parties limit their
discussion of abortion to rape cases. Below are some examples
from the MPs speeches, which point out the prevalence of rape
cases and argue for the right to abortion in this frame.
MP from the CHP, Ensar Öğüt states the following:
“…Before abortion, rape cases have to be prevented. What
would happen to the lady who has been subjected to a
rape crime? Whose fault is it when a disabled girl is
raped?…What will happen to her child? She cannot take
care of herself… How will she take care of the baby?”
(Milliyet, 2012d).
Here, Öğüt seems to be sure that the right to abortion is
unquestionable when a rape case is at stake yet his discourse
that reduces the defense of abortion to rape cases, does not
provide him a ground to elaborate on the significance of
women's choice on this matter. Furthermore, his sexist
language, i.e. his remark “what would happen to the rights of
a lady who is raped?” is another shortfall in his “pro-abor-
tion” discourse. With the aim to defend the rights of the
sexually violated woman, he chooses a vocabulary that
would desexualize her. In other words, he uses the term
“lady” instead of “woman” but this attempt connotes nothing
but a misogynist mind-set.
An MP from the MHP, Ruhsar Demirel's declarations pro-
vide another example where we can observe how the right to
abortion is defended solely by pointing out the prevalence of
rape cases in Turkey:
“…You cannot expect from a woman to give birth to a
baby of a rape case. Some colleagues have made some
declarations on this issue. I suggest to them the following:
they should look into the eyes of a woman who has been
subjected to sexual violation. … I wonder whether they
have ever met such a woman, such a child.” (Vatan, 2012).
MP from the CHP, Melda Onur's defense of abortion
reiterates Demirel's discourse:
“… PM should take into account all those women who
have been raped and have become pregnant. What shall
we do, are we going to marry them with the rapists?”
(Milliyet, 2012e).
As clearly observed in the examples above, MPs
defending the right to abortion merely over rape cases do
not construct their argument on the basis of women's
control on their bodies. This approach limiting the defense
of the right to abortion to sexually violated women
victimizes women's existence in the realm of reproduction
and sexuality.
Nonetheless, it is significant to highlight different layers in
women MPs pro-abortion discourses. Even though in some
parts of their argument they limit their defense of the right to
abortion to rape cases, both Demirel and Onur, in other parts
of their discourse, clearly articulate their opposition against
the utilization of women's body for political purposes.
Demirel strongly states that she is in favor of doing politics
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argues for women's agency and autonomy with regard to
abortion and c-section and utters that “… it is thewomanwho
will decide on c-section, abortion or vaginal birth… These
men have to take their hands off women's bodies.”
From here, one could derive that women MPs' pro-abortion
arguments contain pro-feminist ideas in various degrees. At
one point theymay rely on a discourse that is quite reluctant to
touch upon women's autonomy of their reproductive capaci-
ties; yet at another point, their argument may turn into a
pro-feminist argument enunciating that women have the
ultimate control on their bodily integrity.Abortion as an economic imperative
Another limitation of the pro-abortion arguments can be
found in discourses defending the right to abortion solely on
socio-economic terms. In response to Erdoğan's remarks on
abortion, some MPs underlined that prohibition of abortion
would result in the rise of maternal deaths since in this case,
women, who cannot afford to have abortions abroad, would
attempt to self-induce abortions in backrooms by applying
traditional methods.
MP from the CHP, Hülya Güven points out the high rates
of maternal deaths in the pre-1983 period in Turkey, when
abortion was not legal:
“In the past, weren't women dying because they could
not go to a doctor and resorted to feathers, sticks or
other traditional methods? We will go back to those
days. Those who have the ﬁnancial means will go to
Cyprus or the Greek islands to have an abortion; those
poor and uneducated women who cannot go abroad for
such an operation will die.” (http://www.hulyaguven.
com/?p=5911).
By drawing attention to the possible rise in self-induced
abortions at home in case of prohibition of abortion, Güven
points out a crucial aspect of the current public debate. Yet,
this pro-abortion stance, marked by a genuine concern for
the possible rise of maternal mortality, does not capture
gendered consequences fully. Even though there is no
question that those who would suffer the most from a
possible ban on abortion would be economically disadvan-
taged women, this is a limited argument that does not
address all women with different needs to have a safe
abortion.
Another example where abortion is primarily defined as a
necessity that arises due to lack of means to maintain the
pregnancy can be found in Aylin Nazlıaka's speeches, MP
from the CHP:
“The minister cannot show me a single woman who chose
abortion not because of a health complication or social and
economic problems but willingly and happily. If she can
show me such a woman I will give her a diamond ring as
present.” (http://www.ntv.com/id25354530/).
In another declaration, Nazlıaka goes further in her analysis
and carries the debate on abortion on the axis of women's
autonomy, without feeling the need to tone down her pro-abortion stance by justifying the right to abortion through
inevitable consequences:
“The PM should quit doing politics over woman's body. In
brief, I am telling the PM he ought to stop standing guard
over women's vaginas.” (Milliyet, 2012e).
Reflecting on Nazlıaka's adamant call for women's
autonomy and also the limitations in her pro-abortion
arguments, it is possible to say that the hybridity in this
discourse may have been deployed as a political tactic to
voice a “viable” argument that may have an effect on the
patriarchal political scene in Turkey. In this regard, one can
argue that women MPs take into account the “rules of the
game” defined by the male politicians in politics and
formulate some parts of their pro-abortion discourses
accordingly.
To conclude, criticizing the AKP's anti-abortion initiative,
the opposition parties contributed to the circulation of a
“pro-abortion” discourse in the public sphere in Turkey.
However, when their statements are thoroughly analyzed, it
becomes clear that their “pro-abortion” stance is not always
motivated by pro-feminist concerns; rather certain discursive
limits in their statements hinder their contribution to the public
debate on abortion on the basis of a woman's autonomy on her
bodily integrity. In this regard, some parliamentarians
interpret Erdoğan's anti-abortion discourse as a strategy to
cover up important controversial topics such as Uludere.
Perhaps quite rightfully, they point out the rhetorical
intentions embedded in Erdoğan's speech yet by doing so,
some of them fail to touch upon the implications that this
anti-abortion initiative generated for gender relations in
Turkey. We argue that to evaluate Erdoğan's anti-abortion
stance only in terms of the dynamics of rhetoric is a serious
discursive limitation of opposition parties' statements that
obscures the gendered consequences involved in this public
debate. Secondly, some MPs opposed Erdoğan's anti-abortion
initiative by suggesting that there aremore urgent topics on the
political agenda to deal with than regulating women's repro-
ductive capacities. This perspective trivializes the issue of
abortion and attempts to depoliticize women's reproductive
rights. Another discursive limitation in the opposition's “pro-
abortion” discourses is the medicalization of abortion. This
approach presents abortion as a technical issue that should be
reserved for experts. Some parliamentarians utilize this medical
definition of abortion todefine the boundaries of thepolitical and
to refrain from making a gendered analysis of abortion debates.
Another theme that recurs in MPs declarations is the
defense of the right to abortion with a reference to rape cases.
With the aim to justify abortion against AKP's conservative,
patriarchal pro-life discourses, MPs frequently give reference
to the prevalence of rape cases in Turkey and seem to defend
the right to abortion only for women who have been sexually
violated out of wedlock. Even though they touch upon a
critical point regarding the abortion debates in Turkey, the
formation of the pro-abortion discourses solely in this respect
does not capture the whole spectrum of the gendered
consequences that the anti-abortion initiative gave rise to.
Furthermore, some of the MPs prefer to present the issue of
abortion exclusively as a socio-economic phenomenon and
underline the fact that restricting abortion would result in
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to have an abortion abroad would attempt to self-induce
abortions in backrooms. Framing the right to abortion as a
socio-economic imperative blurs the potential of the abor-
tion debates to generate a discursive space where arguments
for women's autonomy on their bodies could be articulated
and the right to abortion becomes inclusive of all women
with different needs to have an abortion.
Relying on the interpretive framework above, one can
suggest that a discourse defining the terms for “legitimate”
abortion has come to the foreground in Turkey as a result of the
current debates on women's reproductive capacities. Accord-
ingly, someMPs from the opposition parties defendedwomen's
right to abortion in such a way as to define what the legitimate
conditions are for a woman to demand abortion. For them,
abortion is more legitimate for women who are sufferers of
rape crimes or experience financial difficulty. This understand-
ing establishes a hierarchy between different claims to the right
to abortion. It grants this right primarily to women who are
presented as “victims”, i.e., victims of rape crimes or economic
hardship; women who demand autonomy on their bodily
integrity11 are not seen as significant actors in this debate.
The hybridity in women MPs discourses is the other critical
aspect of the recent public debate on abortion. Some women
MPs articulate a pro-abortion position yet in some parts of their
arguments they may be quite wary in defendingwomen's right
to abortion. They combine the pro-feminist defense of abortion
with an understanding that conceptualizes the issue of abortion
regardless of women's choice. The term “discursive opportunity
structure” can be helpful here to deconstruct this hybridity and
understand the power configurations in the public sphere in
Turkey, which favor certain ideas that echo the dominant
discourse and exclude other marginal positions.
Discursive opportunity structures refer to ways of thinking
that provide political acceptability of specific ideas (Ferree,
2003; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). They explain
the interactive relationship between the discursive context and
the speaker's strategic choice to formulate certain discourses.
To make her statements more effective within the boundaries
set by the hegemonic discourse, the speaker may strategically
prefer certain rhetorical tools that would tone down radical
elements in her argument. By doing so, she aims to avoid
agitating those who are in power positions and represent the
hegemonic codes. In this sense, discursive opportunity struc-
tures enable the speaker to respond to the challenges of
articulating a marginalized position in the public sphere and
make her arguments effective vis-à-vis the dominant set of
ideas. One can suggest that to counter the anti-abortion
discourses and render their arguments effective in the patriar-
chal political arena, women MPs in Turkey make use of certain
discursive opportunity structures. While in some parts of their
discourse women MPs strongly argue for women's full control
on their bodies, in other parts, they interpret the debate on
abortion just as a rhetorical tool or conceptualize the right to
abortion solely over rape cases or economic hardship. Further-
more, some of them utilize the medicalization discourse, which
is geared towards depoliticizing corporeal issues and works
against women's right to control their bodies, but they formulate
it it in such away as to counter themale hegemonic discourse on
abortion. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate women MPs'
deployment of hybrid discourses as an attempt to make useof certain discursive opportunity structures. This rhetorical
strategy helps them to render their arguments more viable and
effective in the patriarchal realm of politics.
Conclusion
In Turkey, modern administrative power has always pro-
duced regulatory practices on women's sexualities, bodies and
reproduction. States have historically been inclined to regulate
reproduction with the aim of sustaining population growth and
reinforcing the norms of a household constituted by a married
heterosexual couple (Turner, 2008). In the late Ottoman and
early Republican periods, women's sexualities had become
symbolic of the ongoing social and political changes. Ideal
woman in the male imagination was defined through
sexual chastity and purity; women were asked to be active
in the public sphere yet modest in terms their mores and
manners. Demographic policies and regulation of abortion
clearly reflect this proliferating discourse on women's
sexuality. The Ottoman state in the nineteenth century
encouraged maternity and regulated women's productivity.
In a similar vein, the early Republican period adopted pronatalist
policies to control women's reproductive capacities. In the post-
1965 era, a new demographic approach was adopted to combat
overpopulation, which also successfully introduced certain
regulations surveiling women's bodies. Erdoğan's anti-abortion
initiative in 2012 can be perceived in continuity with these
earlier periods.
Along with this continuity across different historical eras,
there are also remarkable commonalities between different
political parties' positions on the matter. In this sense, AKP's
anti-abortion initiative, mirroring the party's conservative,
patriarchal politics which defines ideal womanhood over the
familial sphere, reiterates earlier historical periods and previ-
ous administration's attempts to utilize women's bodies for
political purposes. Yet, when analyzed carefully, MPs from
opposition parties do not produce more egalitarian discourses
when they oppose against AKP's stance on abortion. Rather,
one can allege that their “pro-abortion” discourses are severely
restricted by certain discursive limits which do not allow them
to form their statements prioritizing women's autonomy.
What is also quite striking in thewide spectrumof opposition
discourses is the hybridity that characterizes women MPs'
discourses. It is possible to interpret this hybridity as a strategic
move on their part to render their arguments more effective in
the patriarchal realm of politics. Yet, when evaluated overall,
the “pro-abortion” discourses of opposition parties are greatly
hampered by discursive limits that do not prioritize thewomen's
autonomy. In their discourses, abortion as a reproductive right is
a need to be granted to victimized women, who live under
economic hardship or have been subject to rape. By presenting
woman solely as “victims”when the right to abortion is at stake,
some opposition discourses openly refrain from recognizing
women's autonomy in the realm of sexuality and reproduction
and thus mirror the AKP's patriarchal mind-set.
Consequently, considering state's interest in controlling the
population, it is necessary to recognize the reproductive aspects
of the construction of citizenship. Since state power, citizenship
and reproduction are deeply interlocked in modern Turkey,
familial ideology of procreation plays a significant role in the
constitution of the social rights ofmodern citizenship. Thismodel
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linewith thedemographic policies in force. Accordingly, the ideal
woman citizen is defined as someone who reproduces the
political aims underlying the demographic policies. The recent
public debate on abortion in contemporary Turkey has brought
into the open thatwomenwho claim the right to abortion on the
basis of their autonomy on their bodies do not count as ideal
citizens neither in AKP's anti-abortion statements not in the
opposition parties' “pro-abortion” discourses. As a result, it is
clear that the terms of reproductive citizenship in contemporary
Turkey is reinforced through the utilization of women's bodies
and subjection of women to demographic state policies.
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Endnotes
1 On December 28, 2011, with the argument that they have detected
militants who engage in the cross border smuggling trade and serve the
Kurdistan Workers Party's interests, the Turkish Armed Forces conducted an
air raid on Uludere, a town in the province of Şırnak, which resulted in the
killing of 34 civilians, most of them teenage boys. This mass killing in
Uludere has led to intense public debates in Turkey and thus represents a
critical moment in the AKP government's policies towards Kurds.
2 Nursuna Memecan, as a woman MP from the AKP, declared that she is
against a possible ban on abortion (http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/ak-parti-li-
memecan-kurtajyasaklanmasin/siyaset/siyasetdetay/08.06.2012/1550936/
default.htm). In a similar vein, Haluk Özdalga, in his article at the daily Taraf
also opposed his party's anti-abortion initiative (http://www.taraf.com.tr/
haber/kurtaj-yasagi-yanlis.htm).
3 Duben and Behar (1991: 199) state that the early Ottoman novels
represented “a growing and increasingly unnerving sense that women are
getting out of hand.” Furthermore, since sexuality as a problematic theme
was distanced from the deﬁnitions of ideal woman, in order to write about
sexuality Ottoman male writers could only refer to concubines or western
female characters because the carnal issues were despicable and they could
be only associated with the “impure” woman. Such dreads vis-a-vis the
ubiquitous effects of modernization revolved around women were not
peculiar to the literary realm but were deeply entrenched in the general
public discourse.
4 By authorizing a two-thirds reduced penalty for those who brought
about an abortion with the aim to save his own honor, that of his wife, his
mother, his daughter, or his sister, this regulation explicitly deﬁnes male
honor over woman's womb (Miller, 2007: 362).
5 OnMarch 8, 2008, attending a gathering on the occasion ofWomen's Day,
Erdoğan urgedwomen to have at least three children andwarned that failing to
preserve a young population would endanger the future of the nation (http://
www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/8448562.asp?gid=231&52=52955).
6 The AKP leadership attempted to add a clause to the Turkish Penal Code
in September 2004, which would make adultery a crime. However, criticism
coming from the press, women's organization and the EU prevented the AKP
from adding the clause into the Penal Code.
7 In 2004, an amendment has been made in the Penal Code, stating that
marriage would not nullify criminal responsibility in the cases of rape.
Another change was made in 2005 in the Law on Municipalities, whichobliges municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants to open women's
shelters. In 2009, the Parliamentary Commission for the Equality of
Opportunity for Women and Men is formed.
8 It is argued that the BDP is more sensitive on gender issues in that it
allocated signiﬁcant number of seats to women candidates and operates on a
co-leadershipmodel, represented by awoman andman leader. However, when
the party's recent pro-abortion discourses are carefully analyzed, one can see
that their position on gender relations is also marked by some limitations that
prevent some of theMPs in the party fromprioritizingwomen's control on their
bodily integrity.
9 For further discussion on this matter, see Akyüz (2012).
10 Medicalization connotes the subordination of certain aspects of life
to the authority of medicine. Thus, it expands the scope of the modern bio-
power by introducing regulatory frameworks on practices and experiences
which may have left to individual discretion before. When analyzed
through gendered lenses, it turns out that medicalization of women's lives
may be based upon unequal gender relations. Investigating medicalization
of births in Turkey through following women's birth narratives, Cindoglu
and Sayan-Cengiz (2010) maintain that the medicalization discourse
closely collaborates with traditional gender roles and contributes to the
patriarchal control on women's bodies. In this regard, expansion of the
scope of medical authority on women's lives cannot be thought in isolation
from the prevalent patriarchal codes.
11 This latter position is represented by feminist women who organized
protests against the government's anti-abortion initiative by shouting slogans
“Take your hands off our bodies”.
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